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Introduction

Formal and Real Power
We are going to examine how individual power in groups can be integrated into a general equilibrium model. We consider a finite pure exchange economy with multimember groups. While we stick to the suggestive term "group", a broader interpretation as socio-economic group or simply group would be appropriate in many instances.
Groups are endogenously formed: An allocation consists of a partition of the consumer population into groups and an allocation of commodities to consumers. Group members have individual preferences. They make efficient collective consumption decisions based on their individual preferences, where different groups may use different collective decision mechanisms. Moreover, at the going prices, individuals may decide to leave a multi-member group and become singles. In equilibrium, no individual wants to exercise this exit option.
Groups operate within a competitive market environment. Therefore, neither groups nor deserting members have any market power. Nonetheless, individuals can exert power in multi-member groups. The departure from the traditional model of pure exchange enables us to examine individual power in such groups. We focus on two notions of power: formal and real power. The former refers to the say in group decisions captured, e.g., by the weight in a group welfare function or by the relative bargaining power in Nash bargained group decisions. Real power refers to the additional utility an individual can achieve in a group in comparison to the stand-alone utility as a single person.
Main Results
First, we introduce competitive equilibria with free exit which serve as the basic concept for our investigation of power. Next, we define real power in groups in such an equilibrium and identify instances of its absence as well as its presence. Third, we identify circumstances in which the presence of maximal real power is compatible with Pareto efficiency. We conclude that high real power per se is no indication of social inefficiency. Fourth, we introduce formal power and illustrate that higher formal power does not necessarily translate into higher equilibrium utility or higher real power because groups may dissolve or relative price changes may offset higher formal power.
Fifth, we identify conditions under which changes of formal power in one group do not affect other groups in society and, thus, power spill-overs are absent. Finally, we establish existence of competitive equilibria with free exit, including equilibria where some individual enjoys real power. Overall, our approach enables us to make a first albeit moderate step toward the study of endogenous power, its determinants and consequences in general equilibrium.
Related Work
The notion of power can have very different meanings in economics. Concepts such as market power, veto power, agenda setting power, voting power, bargaining power, and power indices are well known.
Here we develop a framework to define power in a general equilibrium context. Our approach is in the tradition of cooperative models of groups as recently surveyed by Apps and Rees (2009) . In this tradition, we integrate collective rationality of groups into a general equilibrium model. We start from Gersbach and Haller (2011) and develop a suitable framework to examine the role of individual power. Our paper is also related to the influential work of Hirschman (1970) who has considered the comparative efficiency of the exit and voice options as mechanisms of recuperation. Our analysis suggests that the exit option limits power as long as externalities in groups are sufficiently small. Our notions of real and formal power can be viewed as a parallel to formal and real authority in organizations (Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) ). The former refers to the right to decide and the latter to effective control over decisions. In our model, formal power captures the say in collective decisions and real power captures the increase of an individual's welfare resulting from such decisions in a competitive environment. A key feature -distinguishing this paper from the literature (e.g. Aghion and Tirole (1997) , Gersbach and Haller (2009) ) -is the assumption of price-dependent outside options. This not only yields new phenomena, but also allows to study the relationship between power and Pareto optimality in a general equilibrium setting.
Finally, two core ingredients of our equilibrium concept -price taking and free exit -have a long history in the literature on group formation. Well-known contributions on local public good economies and group formation games (e.g. Guesnerie and Oddou (1981) , Greenberg and Weber (1986) , Weber (1997, 1998)) have developed non-cooperative equilibrium concepts and characterized equilibrium existence and properties with these ingredients, also including stronger stability conditions. We focus on group formation when the group takes collective decisions and may trade in commodity markets with other groups as an entity.
Outline
The paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections, we introduce the formal framework and define an equilibrium with free exit. Section 4 explores the presence of real power and the relationship between real power and Pareto efficiency. In section 5, we study the relationship between formal and real power and their equilibrium implications. In section 6, we consider the special case of quasi-linear utilities. Section 7 deals with existence of competitive equilibria with free exit. Section 8 concludes.
More elaborate proofs are collected in an appendix.
Consumer Characteristics and Allocations
In this section, we describe the basic structure of the model: consumers, group structures, commodities, endowments, allocations, preferences, and optimality.
Consumers and Group Structures. We consider a finite population of consumers, represented by a set I = {1, . . . , N }. A generic consumer is denoted by i or j. H = {h ⊆ I : h = ∅} constitutes the set of all potential groups. A generic group is denoted by h or h . A single-person group formed by individual i is denoted by {i}. The population I will be partitioned into groups. That is, there exists a partition P of I into non-empty subsets which represent groups. We call any such partition P a group structure in I. If P consists of H groups, we frequently label them h = 1, . . . , H, provided this causes no confusion.
We treat the group structure as an object of endogenous choice: Groups are endogenously formed so that some group structure P is ultimately realized. Consequently, our consumer allocation space is P, the set of all group structures in I. For P ∈ P and i ∈ I, let P (i) denote the unique element of P to which i belongs.
Commodities. There exists a finite number ≥ 1 of commodities. Each commodity is formally treated as a private good, possibly with externalities in consumption.
Each consumer i ∈ I has a consumption set X i = IR + so that the commodity allocation space is X ≡ i∈I X i . Generic elements of X are denoted x = (x i ) i∈I , y = (y i ) i∈I . Commodities are denoted by superscripts k = 1, . . . , . For a group h ∈ H, set X h = i∈h X i , the consumption set for group h. X h has generic elements x h = (x i ) i∈h . If x = (x i ) i∈I ∈ X is a commodity allocation, then consumption for group h is x h = (x i ) i∈h , the restriction of x = (x i ) i∈I to h .
Endowments. For a group h ∈ H, its endowment is a commodity bundle ω h ∈ IR given by the sum of the endowments of all participating individuals: ω h = i∈h ω {i} .
The social endowment is given by
(1)
Allocations. An allocation is a pair (x; P ) ∈ X × P specifying the consumption bundle and group membership of each consumer. We call an allocation (x; P ) ∈ X × P feasible, if
Consumer Preferences. In principle, a consumer might have preferences on the allocation space X × P and care about each and every detail of an allocation. For individual i ∈ I, we assume that i has preferences on X × P represented by a utility function U i : X × P → IR.
In the following, we shall make the general assumption that an individual does not care about the features of an allocation beyond the boundaries of his own group. If a particular group structure is given, he is indifferent about the affiliation and consumption of individuals not belonging to his own group. Condition HSP below is a formal expression of this assumption. To formally represent such group-specific preferences, let us define H i ≡ {h ⊆ I|i ∈ h} for i ∈ I. H i is the set of potential groups of which i would be a member. Let us further denote X * = h∈H X h and define
(HSP) Group-Specific Preferences:
The general assumption HSP is justifiable on the grounds that we want to design a model where multi-member groups play a significant allocative role. A more detailed justification of this assumption is given in Gersbach and Haller (2011) . HSP still admits a lot of flexibility. For example, it permits various types of consumption externalities.
Later on, we shall exploit the occurrence of pure group externalities that depend solely on the persons belonging to a group and not on consumption.
(PGE) Pure Group Externalities:
For each consumer i, there exist functions U Fact 1 Suppose PGE holds. Then:
(i) For any P ∈ P, there exists P ∈ P * with P P .
(ii) For any P ∈ P \ P * , there exists P ∈ P * with P P .
(iii) P * ⊆ P * .
(iv) If P * is a singleton, say P * = {P }, and x is a Pareto optimal allocation of the pure exchange economy given by (X i , U c i , ω {i} ) i∈I , then (x; P ) ∈ M * and P * = P * = {P }.
(i) and (ii) follow from the finiteness of P. Regarding (iii), if P ∈ P * , then there exists a feasible x with (x; P ) ∈ M * . In case P / ∈ P * , there exists P ∈ P * with P P , by (ii). But then (U i (x; P )) i∈I > (U i (x; P )) i∈I , contrary to (x; P ) ∈ M * . This shows (iii). (iv) follows immediately from the definitions. Notice that P * = P * does not hold in general. For instance, P * = ∅ can occur while always P * = ∅.
Equilibrium
There are several conceivable ways to formulate an equilibrium state of a model with variable group structure. We follow Gersbach and Haller (2011) and employ the concept of a competitive equilibrium with free exit. We consider a group h ∈ H and a price system p ∈ IR + . For x h = (x i ) i∈h ∈ X h , p · i∈h x i denotes the expenditure of group h on consumption plan x h at the price system p. Then h's budget set is defined as
We next define the efficient budget set EB h (p) as the set of x h ∈ B h (p) with the property that there is no
Further we define a state of the economy as a triple (p, x; P ) such that p ∈ IR + is a price system and (x; P ) ∈ X × P is an allocation. I.e., x = (x i ) i ∈ I is an allocation of commodities and P is an allocation of consumers (a group structure, a partition of the population into groups). A state (p, x; P ) is a competitive equilibrium with free exit (CEFE) if it satisfies the following conditions:
2.
3. There are no h ∈ P , i ∈ h and
Condition 1 reflects collective rationality. Efficient choice by the group refers to the individual consumption and welfare of its members, not merely to the aggregate consumption bundle of the group. Condition 2 requires market clearing. Conditions 1 and 2 alone define a competitive equilibrium (p, x), given group structure P , discussed and studied in Haller (2000) and Gersbach and Haller (2001) .
In addition, we impose condition 3 that no individual wants to leave a group and participate as a one-member group in the market at the going equilibrium prices. Condition 3 constitutes an individual rationality or voluntary participation (membership)
constraint. Conditions 1 to 3 together define a competitive equilibrium with free exit.
Real Power
Informally, a person enjoys real power in a group, if the person's utility exceeds her stand-alone value, the utility she can achieve as a single individual. For a formal
Proof. For all h ∈ P, i ∈ h and
Definition 1 (Real Power) Let (p, x; P ) be a CEFE and h ∈ P, i ∈ h. We say that individual i enjoys real power in the CEFE (p,
Absence and Presence of Real Power
Any discussion of real power in the present context ought to begin with the neutrality theorem of Gersbach and Haller (2011, Proposition 1) . The neutrality or no-power the-orem states that in the absence of any externalities, individuals cannot achieve higher utility levels by participating in groups rather than acting and trading individuallywhich renders the notion of power within groups obsolete. For real power to exist, there has to be some advantage, some positive externality in group formation.
2 We are going to show that the existence of externalities can indeed create real power for individuals in a group. To this end, we formulate the concept of strong large group advantage, which postulates that given his own consumption, a consumer always fares better as member of the particular multi-person group than as a single consumer, regardless of the consumption of other group members.
Definition 2 Let h ∈ H.
Strong large group advantage prevails in group h if
Strong large group advantage in group h implies |h| > 1.
Proposition 1 (Presence of Real Power) Let (p, x; P ) be a CEFE. Suppose for some group h ∈ P , strong large group advantage prevails in group h and V 0 i (p) = max {U i (y i ; {i})| y i ∈ B {i} (p)} holds for every consumer i ∈ h. Then there exists a member i ∈ h who enjoys real power.
Proof. Let (p, x; P ) be a CEFE. Further let h ∈ P such that strong large group advantage prevails in group h and
Hence to the contrary, some member of h must enjoy real power.
is continuous in y i , but may not hold otherwise.
In addition to Proposition 1, we are going to demonstrate the occurrence of real power in Example 1 below. The proposition shows that given a multi-member group h which is formed in a particular CEFE, at least one member of group h enjoys real power if the strong large group advantage condition holds for the consumers in h. Such is the case in Example 1.
Example 1. Let = 2, I = {1, 2, 3}. Preferences exhibit pure group externalities, that is, they are represented by
captures the pure group externality contributing to the utility of individual i. Specifically, we assume
We further assume the individual endowments
In this example, (p * , x * ; P * ) with p * = (1, 1),
. Both members of group {1, 2} enjoy real power ln 2 in the particular equilibrium. However, it is not necessarily the case that both members of the two-person group enjoy real power in a CEFE. To see this, consider instead the state (p * * , x * * ; P * ) with p * * = (1, 2/3),
2 ) maximizes U 1 on the budget set of group {1, 2} subject to the further constraint
Real Power and Pareto Otimality
In this subsection, we are going to examine competitive equilibria with free exit and to look specifically for Pareto optimality and manifestation of power. Prima facie, manifestation of other notions of power appears to be detrimental to efficiency. For instance, market power is frequently -but not always -associated with inefficiency.
In our model, however, consumers and groups operate in a perfectly competitive market environment. Therefore, market power does not exist and thus cannot be the source of any inefficiency. Inefficient equilibrium allocations in our model, to the extent that For our inquiry into power in general equilibrium, the most pertinent question is how real power and equilibrium efficiency are related. First of all, CEFE allocations can be inefficient. In Example 1, let P 0 = {{1}, {2}, {3}} denote the group structure consisting of all singletons. The state (p * , x * ; P 0 ) is a CEFE. The equilibrium allocation (x * ; P 0 ) is weakly dominated by (Pareto inferior to) the allocation (x * ; P * ) of the CEFE (p * , x * ; P * ), since ceteris paribus the utilities in the two-person group {1, 2} are strictly higher while the third individual obtains the same utility. Hence CEFE may even be Pareto-ranked.
Second, the presence of real power is consistent with Pareto optimality. In the CEFE (p * , x * ; P * ) of Example 1, consumers 1 and 2 enjoy real power and the equilibrium allocation is Pareto-optimal. Third, absence of real power is consistent with Pareto optimality as well. E.g., in the absence of any externalities, competitive equilibria with free exit (with any group structure) exist under standard assumptions. Then the first welfare theorem holds and none of the consumers enjoys real power.
We conclude that while the presence of real power is compatible with Pareto optimality, the two properties are not closely related in general. But under certain circumstances, when strong large group advantage prevails, Pareto optimality requires real power:
Proposition 2 Let (p, x; P ) be a CEFE. Suppose that (i) strong large group advantage prevails in all groups h ∈ H with |h| = 2;
(ii) strong large group advantage prevails in all groups h ∈ P with |h| > 1;
(iii) the allocation (x; P ) is Pareto-optimal and
Then there exists a consumer i ∈ I who enjoys real power in the CEFE (p, x; P ).
Proof. Let (p, x; P ) be a CEFE such that (i) -(iv) hold. Then for (i) and (iii) to hold, there can be at most one consumer whose group in P is a singleton. For if P = {. . . , {i}, {j}} with i, j ∈ I, i = j, then because of strong large group advantage in group h = {i, j}, i and j are better off and nobody is worse off at the feasible allocation (x; P ) than at (x; P ), where P = P \ {{i}, {j}} ∪ {{i, j}}. Since (x; P ) is Pareto-optimal, this cannot be the case and, therefore, P contains at most one singleton. It follows, since N ≥ 2, that P includes at least one group h with |h| ≥ 2. By
(ii) and (iv), such a multi-person group satisfies the hypothesis of Proposition 1 and, consequently, has a member who enjoys real power.
Finally, we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of CEFE where maximal real power and Pareto efficiency coexist. Maximal real power in a CEFE is realized if there is no other CEFE in which real power is higher for some individuals in their respective groups and not less for any individual.
Proposition 3 Suppose pure group externalities, that is
is a competitive equilibrium of the pure exchange economy represented
(ii) all U c i , i ∈ I, satisfy local non-satiation, and (iii) P * is the unique optimal group structure based solely on group preferences represented by U g i , i ∈ I, then (iii) the state (p, x; P * ) is a fully Pareto optimal CEFE and (iv) there does not exist another CEFE in which real power is higher for some individuals in their respective groups and not less for any individual.
The proof is given in the appendix. We illustrate Proposition 3 by means of an example.
Example 2. We can again use lead Example 1. Clearly, the group structure P * = {{1, 2}, {3}} is the unique optimal group structure based solely on group preferences.
The competitive equilibrium based solely on U In any other CEFE that can generate real power we must have P = P * . As discussed in section 4, equilibria with P * = {{1, 2}, {3}} have equilibrium prices p * = 1,
with α denoting the utilitarian weight of individual 1 in the group {1, 2} and α ∈ [
Hence, such equilibria generate real power of: ), then ρ 1 is smaller than ρ 0 1 . Confirming Proposition 3, it is impossible that real power in a CEFE is larger for some individuals and not less for others than in (p 0 , x 0 , P * ).
We remark that in Examples 1 and 2, (x * ; P * ) = ((1/2, 0), (0, 1/2), (1/2, 1/2)); {{1, 2}, {3}})
as well as (x; {I}) = ((0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 1)); {I}) are full Pareto optima and, thus, P * is not the only optimal group structure, although P * is the unique optimal group structure based solely on group preferences. This seems at odds with Fact 1 (iii).
Notice, however, that Fact 1 (iii) is derived under the assumption of utility func-
and result in the same conclusions otherwise, but render the calculations more complicated.
Formal and Real Power
We have seen that the existence of externalities can create real power for agents in a group. In Examples 1 and 2, this has been achieved with positive group externalities. The next example is a generalization of Example 1. It serves to introduce the concepts of formal power and to explore the relationship between formal and real power. Equilibria. Commodity prices are normalized so that p 1 = 1. Then there exists a unique competitive equilibrium (p 0 , x 0 ; P 0 ), given the group structure P 0 = {1}, {2}, {3} :
Like in Example 1, we obtain the CEFE with group structure P * = {1, 2}, {3} as the equilibria of the form (p * , x * ; P * ) with
The non-exit conditions in group {1, 2} require α ∈ [α, α] = [
Utilitarian Social Welfare Maximization
Continuing with the analysis of Example 3, let us now assume a price system p = (1, p 2 ) and further assume that group h = {1, 2} maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function
subject to the budget constraint x The group externalities do not affect excess demand of group h = {1, 2}. The excess demand vectors of the groups h and h = {3}, denoted by z h and z h , are given by z h = (αp 2 , −α),
A market equilibrium without exit considerations (p * , x * ), with given group structure P * , would require
Hence the parameter α used previously corresponds to utilitarian welfare weights or Pareto weights α and 1 − α in group h in the equilibrium (p * , x * ) with given group structure P * : Every CEFE with group structure P * is obtained as an equilibrium where group h maximizes its utilitarian welfare with the corresponding welfare weights. We further obtain
Fact 2 ∂α/∂v 1 < 0 and ∂α/∂v 2 > 0.
An increase in the positive externality of individual 1 decreases the lower bound on his weight in the group welfare function, since he is prepared to sacrifice more consumption in order to stay in the group. If v 1 = 1 we obtain α = 
Concepts of Power
At this stage it is useful to distinguish between different notions of power in a group.
We follow closely the setup of the example and assume that the two-person group h maximizes a utilitarian welfare function. Then we can distinguish between two different concepts of power in a competitive equilibrium with free exit:
• Formal power, the say in a group decision expressed either by the weight of an individual's utility in the group welfare function or the weight of an individual in the Nash-bargaining decision of a group.
• Real power, the additional utility an individual can achieve in a group in comparison with exit.
To discuss the two notions of power, we consider Nash-bargained consumption choices in group h = {1, 2} in Example 3. Let for i = 1, 2, x 0 i (p 2 ) denote consumer i's individual demand at the price system (1, p 2 ) when forming a single-person group. Let us consider the possibility that for every price p 2 , group h maximizes the Nash product 2 ) for maximizing N h amounts to:
This is an implicit equation for x 2 2 . Now suppose the same allocation is obtained in a competitive equilibrium with free exit where the group maximizes its utilitarian welfare function W h , with respective weights α and 1 − α. Then we have x 2 2 = 1 − α and thus equation (3) becomes an implicit equation for β:
For each value of α ∈ [α, α], equation (4) defines a unique β(α) ∈ [0, 1], the relative bargaining power of individual 1 that yields the same group decision as the group's utilitarian welfare maximum with weights α and 1 − α. Hence by definition of β(α), the weight α in W h and the weight β = β(α) in N h lead to the same allocation for group h. We obtain the following properties for β(α):
Relationship between Formal and Real Power
Continuing the examination of power in the context of Example 3, we note that a higher weight in the group welfare function translates into higher relative bargaining power, as long as α is in the range
, for which the competitive equilibrium with free exit involving group h exists. The maximal utilities of the individuals are given by
where we have assumed that (p * , x * ; P * ) prevails for α ∈
, while only
, the stand-alone utilities achieved by exit are ln 1 4α
for individual 1 and ln 1 2 for individual 2.
We obtain the following comparisons of utilitarian, bargaining and real power:
and thus agent 2 has a large weight 1 − α, formation of group h is impossible in equilibrium, since individual 1 is better off as a single since ln
. Moreover, no real power or bargaining power exists. ).
, group h does not form, as individual 2 is better off as a single and thus no bargaining or real power exists.
Overall, we observe that higher formal power may not translate into higher real power because groups dissolve, like in case 1 and case 3. Also, higher formal power may not yield higher equilibrium utility because adverse price effects outweigh the higher weight in group decisions, like for consumer 1 in Examples 1 and 3.
Origins of Power
Example 3 further demonstrates that if an individual is neither an externality generator nor an externality receiver, his real power in a two-person group is zero. Namely, if v 1 = v 2 = 1, then group {1, 2} only forms in a CEFE when α = 1/2 and both consumers have zero real power.
However, the same is no longer true in larger groups. Let us continue the example, but modify utility in the following way.
Example 4. Let again = 2, I = {1, 2, 3} and preferences be represented by
in all other cases;
We assume
There exists an equilibrium with free exit (p, x; P ) with group structure P = {1, 2, 3} , namely:
Note that the allocation is an efficient choice of the sole group h = {1, 2, 3} at the going prices. Moreover, markets clear. And neither individual 1 nor individual 2 can gain utility by leaving the group. Although individual i = 3 is neither an externality generator nor an externality receiver, he has real power whereas individuals 1 and 2 do not have any real power. In fact, he extracts all the surplus generated by the favorable externalities which individuals 1 and 2 generate by living together. His only contribution is that he does not destroy the externalities the other individuals in the group generate and receive when he is part of the group.
Fact 4 Suppose that an individual is neither an externality generator nor an externality receiver. Then his real power can be positive if he belongs to a group with more than two members.
Of course, there are other equilibria with free exit in the above example where all three individuals have real power or in which the third individual is powerless.
Larger group size may be conducive to more real power, but only if larger group size gives rise to more positive externalities. 
We find
Fact 5 There exists a CEFE with group structure {I} where consumer 1 has more real power than in any CEFE with group structure P * = {{1, 2}, {3}}.
Fact 5 is proven in the appendix. Here the positive externality received by consumer 3 creates additional surplus that can benefit consumer 1. In contrast, in Example 3, there is no surplus to be shared in group I and consumer 1 has no power when this group is formed.
Quasi-linear Preferences and Spillovers
In this section, we consider the special case of quasi-linear preferences. This case allows to further illustrate our main propositions. It also serves to illustrate to what extent changes of formal power in the form of bargaining power in one group affect other groups. Such an effect is called power spillover.
Setup
We examine a society where n = N/2 > 1 two-member groups will be formed. Group h ∈ {1, . . . , n} has members h1 and h2, called the first member and the second member.
This group structure is denoted by P . There are > 1 goods. The consumption of
The vector x hi = x 1 hi , . . . , x hi denotes the consumption of group member hi. Each group h is endowed with ω h = ω 1 h , . . . , ω h . The two members of group h have quasi-linear utility representations, given by
where V hi is assumed to be strictly concave and strictly increasing in (x 1 hi , . . . , x −1 hi ). The parameters v 1 > 0 and v 2 > 0, which are the same in all two-person groups, capture the group externalities that individuals h1 and h2 experience when living together. When a person is single, he or she has the same utility function with respect to consumption as in a two-person group, but does not experience group externalities.
Living together with the same type of individual 3 or in a group with more than two individuals is assumed to exert negative group externalities on everybody. Hence, such groups will never be formed in a CEFE. For p 0, group h maximizes
subject to the constraints
h2 (p); {h2}) ≥ 0, where 0 < β h < 1 is the bargaining power of individual h1 in group h. The functions x 0 h1 (p) and x 0 h2 (p) denote consumer h1's and h2's individual demand at the price system p when they are singles.
Equilibria
For the group structure P , we denote equilibrium values by x k hi , equilibrium utilities by U hi and V hi , real power by ρ hi , and the equilibrium prices by p. Then ( p, x; P ) is a CEFE. In the following, we assume that for any array of bargaining power parameters (β 1 , . . . , β n ) under consideration: (a) Every group member consumes a non-negative amount of the numéraire good in the CEFE. (b) For the given group structure P and array (β 1 , . . . , β n ), the economy has a unique equilibrium (p, x), up to price normalization. We obtain:
(v) Suppose that groups are homogeneous with respect to utility representations (V h1 = V 1 , V h2 = V 2 ) and endowments with ω h = ω, ∀h = 1, . . . , n. Then:
The proof is given in the appendix.
Discussion
Proposition 4 has several interesting implications which we explore in this subsection.
a) Power Shifts and Power Spillovers
According to Proposition 4 (iv), relative real power and relative bargaining power of a group member coincide. As Proposition 4 further illustrates, a change of bargaining power in group h only influences the distribution of the numéraire in group h.
Consumption of the first −1 commodities is not affected. Moreover, consumption in other groups is not affected either because p remains the same. We formulate this observation as
Corollary 1 (Absence of Power Spillovers) A change of β h in a particular group h has no impact on individuals in other groups.
The corollary states that there are no power spillovers in the case of quasi-linear preferences as bargaining power changes do not affect prices.
b) Manipulability
Corollary 1 also means that a group h cannot manipulate outcomes and possibly improve the utility of all group members at the expense of outsiders by misrepresenting internal bargaining power. Using different bargaining power only within a particular group is merely redistributing utility within this group. Makowski, Ostroy and Segal (1999) have comprehensively characterized continuous, efficient and anonymous incentive compatible mechanisms and have shown that such mechanisms must be perfectly competitive. Quasi-linear preferences are one of the examples that can allow for incentive compatible mechanisms or perfect competition. Our investigation shows that with quasi-linear preferences and the exit option a multi-person group has no incentive to misrepresent the internal bargaining power.
c) Pareto Optimality
Since v 1 > 0 and
h2 ( p); {h2}) > 0 hold when group h maximizes the Nash product (7). Hence (p, x, P ) is a CEFE where all consumers enjoy real power. But is (x; P ) also fully Pareto optimal? The answer is in the affirmative if P is the unique optimal group structure based solely on group preferences. Namely, then U g i ( P (i)) ≥ U g i (P (i)) for any group structure P and i ∈ I, as a consequence of Fact 1 (i). By Proposition 1 of Haller (2000) , x is Pareto optimal given the group structure P . Suppose (x; P ) is not fully Pareto optimal. Then there exists a feasible allocation (x , P ) such that (U i (x ; P )) i∈I > (U i (x; P )) i∈I . But then
contradicting the fact that x is Pareto optimal given the group structure P .
The Impact of Group Externalities
In previous sections, we stressed the role of group externalities. Closer inspection of the proof of Proposition 4 (v) demonstrates that a change of v 1 or v 2 only affects the distribution of the numéraire good within groups as long as the exit conditions are met and we obtain:
Corollary 2 Suppose that groups are homogeneous with respect to utility representations and endowments with ω h = ω, ∀h = 1, . . . , n. Then:
Hence, if individual h1 gains relatively more from living in group h, i.e., when v 1 increases, he receives less of the numéraire good. But the net effect on utility is positive.
Since equilibrium prices are not affected and thus stand-alone utilities remain the same, real power of both individuals increases when v 1 becomes larger.
Existence of CEFE
We finally identify circumstances when CEFE exist. Proposition 2 of Gersbach and
Haller (2011) presents sufficient conditions for the existence of a non-trivial CEFE (p; x; P ) with a group h ∈ P and thresholds δ i (p) ≥ 0, i ∈ h, such that |h| ≥ 2 and
More specific premises yield more specific conclusions:
(ii) all U c i , i ∈ I, satisfy local non-satiation, (iii) P is an optimal group structure solely based on group preferences, (iv) strong large group advantage prevails in all groups h ∈ H with |h| = 2, (v) strong large group advantage prevails in all groups h ∈ P with |h| > 1,
then (p, x; P ) is a CEFE where some consumer enjoys real power.
Observe that conditions (iv) and (v) can be expressed in terms of the functions U g i .
Proof. Because of pure group externalities, (i), (ii) and (v), (p, x; P ) is a CEFE as exit cannot increase utility. By an argument similar to the one given in the proof of Proposition 2, pure group externalities, (iii) and (iv) imply that P contains at least one multi-member group h. By (v) and (vi), such a multi-member group satisfies the hypothesis of Proposition 1 and, consequently, has a member who enjoys real power in the CEFE (p, x; P ).
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a framework that allows to integrate formal and real power into general equilibrium models. We aim at taking a first step toward a study of causes and consequences of power in market economies. There are many desirable extensions, such as allowing agents to generate positive externalities for others endogenously by being friendly or helpful. Moreover, an intriguing question is whether wealthier individuals have higher formal or real power. The analysis of this and other questions related to power must await future research.
for all i, with strict inequality for some i. As P * is the unique optimal group structure based solely on group preferences, we obtain U
for all individuals i, with strict inequality for some individual. Now pick j ∈ I with
∈ EB P (j) (p ), this implies p y i = p ω {i} and, consequently,
Hence, to the contrary, it cannot be the case that in the CEFE (p , y; P ), real power is higher for some individuals and not lower for any individual than in (p, x; P * ).
Proof of Fact 5 step 1: We first determine equilibrium quantities and examine the non-exit conditions in case P = {I}. Given the price system p = (1, p 2 ), group {1, 2, 3} solves
The stand-alone demands are: The market clearing price is given by 1 + p * 2 = 2 1 + α 1 − α 2 .
Then the non-exit condition for the first individual is:
which is equivalent to α 1 ≥ 
step 2: We next examine whether real power of individual 1 can be equal or higher under the group structure P = {{1, 2}, {3}} than under P * = {I}. That is, we examine whether it is possible to delineate parameter values such that ρ 1 ≥ max{ρ * 1 }, where ρ 1 = ln
] (from Example 2) and ρ * 1 is 1's real power in the above equilibrium. When choosing the maximal α = 1 − 1 2v 2 , the inequality is equivalent to ln 4v 2 − 2 2v 2 ≥ max ln 2α 1 (1 + p * 2 ) p * 2 which implies 4v 2 − 2 2v 2 ≥ max 4α 1 1 − α 1 + α 2 .
Observe that with α 1 = α 2 = 1/4, all three non-exit conditions are satisfied and individual 1 enjoys real power ρ * 1 = ln v 1 > 0 in the corresponding CEFE. Therefore, in order to maximize ρ * 1 , it suffices to solve the following problem:
It follows that the optimal solution for α 2 is given by α 2 = . Hence, ρ 1 ≥ max{ρ * 1 } yields (2v 2 − 1)(2v 3 − 1) 2(v 2 − v 3 + 2v 2 v 3 ) ≤ 2v 2 − 1 6v 2 − 2 which implies 4v 3 v 2 − 4v 2 − v 3 ≤ −1 or 4v 2 (v 3 − 1) ≤ v 3 − 1.
Since v 3 > 1, the latter implies 4v 2 ≤ 1 which contradicts v 2 ≥ 1 and, therefore, ρ 1 < max{ρ * 1 } has to hold.
Hence, there are no parameter constellations such that the maximal real power of individual 1 in a CEFE with P = I is strictly smaller than ρ 1 .
Notice that in case v 3 = 1, we are back to Example 2 and ρ 1 = max{ρ * 1 }. In fact, in case v 3 = 1, the foregoing proof shows that ρ 1 > max{ρ * 1 } would yield 0 = 4v 2 (v 3 − 1) < v 3 − 1 = 0 and, thus, 0 < 0; therefore, ρ 1 ≤ max{ρ * 1 } has to hold.
Proof of Proposition 4
Good serves as a numéraire so that the price system assumes the form (p 1 , . . . , p −1 , 1).
We are focusing on interior solutions regarding all commodities, including the numéraire good.
4 Let us consider then the first-order conditions for maximizing ln S h in group h, subject to h's budget constraint:
− λ h p k = 0, k = 1, . . . , − 1;
− λ h = 0;
(1 − β h ) 1 U h2 − U h2 (x 0 h2 (p); {h2}) ∂V h2 ∂x k h2 − λ h p k = 0, k = 1, . . . , − 1;
Therefore:
∂V h1 ∂x
Equation (11) implies that the demand of group h for commodities k = 1, . . . , − 1 is independent of the bargaining power β h and 1−β h of individual h1 and h2, respectively.
Since the V hi are strictly concave and strictly increasing, the budget of the particular group h is exhausted. It follows that h's total demand for commodity is independent of β h as well. Therefore, aggregate demand and, thus, equilibria in commodity markets do not depend on internal bargaining power of groups. As a consequence, changes of bargaining power in group h have no effect on equilibrium prices. This establishes points (i) and (ii).
However, a shift of the power in groups affects the distribution of the numéraire good in group h. Using the notation for the equilibria we have from equation (10):
Since V h1 , v 1 , U h1 (x 0 h1 ( p); {h1}) and V h2 , v 2 , U h2 (x 0 h2 ( p); {h2}) are independent of β h and x h1 + x h2 does not depend on β h either, we obtain the third point (iii):
Furthermore, (12) is tantamount to (iv).
If groups are completely homogeneous with respect to U hi and w h , a group equilibrium does not involve any positive net trades, again using the fact that differences in β h have no effect on aggregate excess demand. Therefore, x h1 + x h2 = ω h and via equation (12) we obtain (v).
